historical precedent in Plato's Meno in which Socrates raises the
question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.
Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of
more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference
in value, but, as Socrates notes, this claim is far from obvious on
closer inspection. After all, a true belief about the correct way to
Larissa is surely of just as much practical use as knowledge of the
way to Larissa—both will get us to our destination. Given that we
clearly do value knowledge more than mere true belief, the fact that
there is no obvious explanation of why this should be so creates a
problem. We will call the issue of why knowledge is more valuable than
mere true belief, the Meno problem.
You can get the rest here - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/
I somehow doubt I will be causing much mouse clicking in posting the
link! I did some work on knowledge justification and value whilst
bored out of my tree, recovering from a serious injury. I was
discovering most of academic study is 'witterpiss for wuckfits' at the
time. There's a big snag in the Meno problem in that it restricts us
to argument not much informed by science. We could sit down all day
trying to define knowledge, which might be nice under the Greek sun
with some Rakis, local beer and imported coffee. No one has defined
knowledge - rather as we don't have a precise decimal for pi. There
are, of course, many definitions.
There are lots of teasers like this in philosophy. My take on this
is :
1.there are some things I believe true and have tested scientifically
or in mathematical proof - these I trust as knowledge
2. there are some things I think true and can't do the above with.
3. etc. etc. on what I consider reliable or barking.
we worry too much about this kind of stuff and not enough about the
issues of the condition of ignorance.
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